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1 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred When It Granted George’s Motion To Dismiss Because She Is Not An 
Indian For Purposes Of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
 
Below, George was alleged to have possessed methamphetamine, paraphernalia, and 
other controlled substances while on the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Reservation.  (R., pp.10-11.)  
Initially, those crimes were investigated by the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Police.  (Id.)  However, 
thereafter, those tribal officials determined that George was not an Indian subject to their 
criminal jurisdiction, due to her lack of enrollment in the Tribe, and instead referred the case to 
Kootenai County officials for prosecution.  (R., pp.8-9.)  The state then charged George with 
separate counts of possession of a controlled substance for Oxycodone, methamphetamine, and 
heroin, and with possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp.52-53.)  George filed a motion to dismiss, 
asserting (notwithstanding the tribal officials’ determination to the contrary) that she was an 
Indian for purposes of tribal criminal jurisdiction.  (R., pp.57-61.)  Disregarding the Idaho Court 
of Appeals’ binding precedent in State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 759 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(overruled on other grounds in State v. Larson, 158 Idaho 130, 344 P.3d 910 (Ct. App. 2015)), 
the district court determined that George was an Indian and that it, therefore, lacked jurisdiction 
and granted her motion.  (R., pp.101-31, 134.) 
In its opening brief, the state showed that (1) Bonaparte is the applicable precedent for 
determining George’s tribal status for jurisdictional purposes and (2), under Bonaparte, George is 
not an Indian for purposes of tribal jurisdiction because, more than just lacking enrollment in the 
Coeur d’Alene Indian Tribe, she is not eligible to enroll as a member of the Tribe.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.3-7.)  Like the district court below, George disregards Bonaparte, apparently asserting 
that Bonaparte has been superseded by the Court of Appeals’ decision in Lewis v. State, 137 
Idaho 882, 55 P.3d 875 (2002).  (See Respondent’s brief, p.8.)  George is mistaken. 
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First, Lewis does not supersede Bonaparte.  Much to the contrary, Lewis actually relies 
on Bonaparte.  See Lewis, 137 Idaho at 885, 55 P.3d at 878.  George claims that, unlike in 
Bonaparte, the Court of Appeals in Lewis recognized that other factors could overcome the lack 
of enrollment in a tribe for jurisdictional purposes.  (Respondent’s brief, p.8.)  But the Court of 
Appeals never reached such a conclusion.  Instead, it stated, “[e]ven assuming that Lewis’s lack 
of enrollment in any tribe is not a bar to his claim that he is an Indian for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1153,” he still would not qualify.  Lewis, 137 Idaho at 885, 55 P.3d at 878 (emphasis added).   
Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Lewis is not the directly applicable 
precedent in this case.  In Lewis, the defendant claimed that he was an Indian subject to tribal 
criminal jurisdiction, notwithstanding his lack of enrollment in any Indian tribe.  Id. at 884-85, 
55 P.3d at 877-78.  The Court of Appeals specifically noted that enrollment was the most 
significant factor in determining whether someone was recognized as an Indian for purposes of 
tribal jurisdiction.  Id. at 885, 55 P.3d at 878.  However, it then humored Lewis by considering 
additional factors beyond enrollment.  Id.  Even after examining those factors, the Court of 
Appeals agreed with the district court’s finding that Lewis had “no significant affiliation with” 
the Tribes.  Id.   
This conclusion—that Lewis was not an Indian for purposes of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction—was reached notwithstanding the fact that Lewis was likely eligible to enroll as a 
member of the Tribe; both Lewis’s brother and sister were enrolled members of the Tribe and 
Lewis had an interest in real property on the reservation.  See id.  Were George eligible for 
enrollment in the Tribe, and simply had not yet enrolled, Lewis might be more applicable.  But 
George is not even eligible to enroll in the Tribe.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)  Because she is 
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not eligible to become a member of the Tribe, Bonaparte is the precedent directly applicable to 
her case, and she cannot claim Indian status for purposes of tribal criminal jurisdiction. 
Like the district court, George also disregards the Court of Appeals’ Bonaparte decision 
in favor of her personal interpretation of various decisions rendered by out-of-state and lower 
federal courts.  (Respondent’s brief, pp.8-19.)  Even assuming that George has correctly 
interpreted these cases, Idaho courts are not bound by the decisions of out-of-state or lower 
federal courts—even on questions of federal law.  See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, ___, 
398 P.3d 146, 148 (2017) (citing Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 
142 Idaho 235, 240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 (2005)).  Idaho district courts are, however, bound by the 
precedents of the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals.  State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 
314, 325 n. 6, 271 P.3d 712, 723 n. 6 (2011) (citing State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842 
P.2d 660, 665 (1992)).  Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedents.  The rule of 
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed “unless it is manifestly wrong, unless 
it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.”  State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 
43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002).  George has not met that burden.   
Finally, George ignores the one determinative factor in this case:  As noted above, 
George was referred to the State of Idaho for prosecution by officials of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
after those officials determined that George was not an Indian for purposes of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.8-9.)  As the Idaho Supreme Court has recently declared, “[t]he Tribes have 
exclusive power to determine membership and eligibility for membership.”  Doe v. Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes, 159 Idaho 741, ___, 367 P.3d 136, 142-43 (2016).  Ultimately, George is asking 
this Court to force recognition of her claimed status as an Indian upon the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 
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due to her participation in Indian culture and religion, and in activities sponsored by the Tribe.  
But being an enthusiast of the Indian Tribe and a member of the Indian Tribe, subject to its tribal 
criminal jurisdiction, are not the same thing.  The Coeur d’Alene Indian Tribe, through its 
officials, has determined that George is not an Indian for purposes of tribal criminal jurisdiction.  
The State of Idaho is not competent to determine otherwise.  The district court should therefore 
be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s erroneous order 
granting George’s motion to dismiss and that it remand this case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 23rd day of February, 2018. 
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